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UNITED	STATES	DISTR	ICT	COURT	
NORTHERN	DISTRI	CT OF	CAL	IFORNIA	_

No. C-06-5433 SC

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

CAPITOL RECORDS, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION; VIRGIN RECORDS AMERICA, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION; MOTOWN RECORD COMPANY,) L.P., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; ARISTA RECORDS LLC, A) DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY;) AND SONY BMG MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, A) DELAWARE GENERAL PARTNERSHIP,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DOROTHY SCHMIDT,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Capitol Records, Inc., Virgin Records America, Inc., Motown Record Company, L.P., Arista Records LLC, and Sony BMG Music Entertainment ("Plaintiffs" or "Record Companies") brought this action against Defendant Dorothy Schmidt ("Defendant" or "Schmidt"). Plaintiffs assert that Schmidt infringed their copyrights in multiple sound recordings by allegedly using an online media distribution system to download, distribute, and/or

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make available for distribution Plaintiffs' copyrighted sound recordings. Defendant was properly served with the Summons and Complaint on September 18, 2006, but failed to respond. Docket No. 7. On November 14, 2006, the Clerk entered default against Defendant. Docket No. 10. On December 26, 2006, Defendant was properly served with the Summons and Amended Complaint. Docket No. 14. The Defendant again failed to respond, and the Clerk entered default against the Defendant on February 9, 2007. Docket No. 18.

Now before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment. For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff Default Judgment and AWARDS Plaintiffs \$6,000.00 in damages, and costs in the amount of \$420.00. The Court further ENJOINS Defendant from directly or indirectly infringing Plaintiffs' rights under federal or state law in any sound recording, whether now in existence or later created, that is owned or controlled by Plaintiffs, or to which Plaintiffs are licensees of exclusive rights under United States copyright, including without limitation, by using the Internet or any online media distribution system to reproduce any such recording, to distribute any such recording, or to make any such recording available for distribution to the public, except pursuant to a lawful license or with the express authority of Plaintiffs. Defendant shall destroy any copies of any sound recordings which Plaintiffs own or to which Plaintiffs are licensees of exclusive rights, that Defendant has downloaded onto any computer hard drive or server without Plaintiffs' authorization, and all copies of

such downloaded sound recordings.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are the copyright owners or licensees of exclusive rights under copyright with respect to certain copyrighted sound recordings, identified in Exhibits A and B to the Amended Complaint. ("Copyrighted Recordings"). Am. Compl., ¶ 11; Kerr Decl., Ex. 1. As such, Plaintiffs hold the exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute the Copyrighted Recordings. Am. Compl., ¶ 12. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 401, Plaintiffs have placed proper notices of copyright on the album cover of each of the Copyrighted Recordings. Id., ¶ 14.

Plaintiffs allege that, without their permission, Defendant has used and continues to use an online media distribution system to download the Copyrighted Recordings, to distribute the Copyrighted Recordings, and to make the Copyrighted Recordings available for distribution to others. Id., ¶ 13. Plaintiffs seek the minimum statutory damages for the alleged infringement of each of the eight identified Copyrighted Recordings, totaling \$6,000.00, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) . Id., ¶ 16; Pl.'s Mot. for Default J. at 2. Additionally, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505, Plaintiffs seek to recover \$420.00 in costs. Pl.'s Mot. for Default J. at 2; Kerr. Decl. ¶ 21. Finally, Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §§ 502 and 503. See Am. Compl., ¶ 17; Pl.'s Mot. for Default J. at 2.

III. <u>LEGAL STANDARD</u>

After entry of default, the Court may enter a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Its decision whether to do so, while "discretionary," Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980), is guided by several factors.

As a preliminary matter, the Court must "assess the adequacy of the service of process on the party against whom default is requested." <u>Bd. of Trs. of the N. Cal. Sheet Metal Workers v. Peters</u>, No. C-00-0395 VRW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19065, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2001).

If the Court determines that service was sufficient, it may consider the following factors in its decision on the merits of a motion for default judgment:

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). "The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true. Geddes v. United. Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). Therefore, for the purposes of this Motion, the Court accepts as true the facts as portrayed in the Amended Complaint.

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IV. <u>DISCUSSION</u>

A. Service of Process

Service of process against Defendant was adequate. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) allows service upon an individual by personally delivering to the individual the summons and complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). On September 18, 2006, copies of the Complaint, the Summons, and other related documents were personally delivered to Ms. Schmidt. See Docket. No. 7. On December 26, 2006, copies of the Amended Complaint and the Summons were personally delivered to Ms. Schmidt. See Docket No. 14.

B. Merits of Motion

Accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true, as it must, the Court finds that $\underline{\text{Eitel}}$ factors favor default judgment.

1. Prejudice

Plaintiffs would be prejudiced absent entry of default judgment. If Defendant is allowed to continue downloading or distributing Plaintiffs' Copyrighted Recordings, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm from copyright infringement. See Am. Compl., ¶ 17. Without the entry of a default judgment, Plaintiffs would not have another remedy for these harms. Such a situation qualifies as prejudice. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

2. <u>Merits of Plaintiffs' Substantive Claim for</u> <u>Copyright Infringement</u>

The Record Companies' claim for infringement of copyrights is meritorious. To prevail on a claim for copyright infringement, Plaintiffs must establish ownership of a valid copyright and

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unauthorized copying of original elements of the protected work by Defendant. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499

U.S. 340, 361 (1991). As alleged in the Amended Complaint,

Plaintiffs are "the copyright owners or licensees of exclusive rights under United States copyright with respect to the Copyrighted Recordings." Am. Compl., ¶ 11. Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act allows the owners of a legal or beneficial interest in a copyright to sue for infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).

Therefore, Plaintiffs satisfy the first element of Feist.

Plaintiffs identify multiple violations of their rights, satisfying the second element of Feist. Defendant has violated the Record Companies' exclusive right to reproduce the Copyrighted Recordings by downloading electronic copies of the Copyrighted Recordings to her computer without permission. Am. Compl., ¶ 13. Defendant has violated the Record Companies' exclusive right to distribute the Copyrighted Recordings by using an online media distribution system to distribute the Copyrighted Recordings to the public. Id. Section 106 of the Copyright Act enumerates the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, including the right to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords, and the right to distribute copies or phonorecords of the work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. <u>See</u> 17 U.S.C. § 106. Anyone who violates these exclusive rights infringes the copyright. See 17 U.S.C § 501(a).

3. Sufficiency of the Complaint

Plaintiffs properly allege the necessary elements for a claim

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of copyright infringement. The Amended Complaint identifies the copyrighted works in dispute, identifies Plaintiffs as owners of legal or beneficial interests in the exclusive rights to those copyrighted works, and describes how Defendant is violating those exclusive rights. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 11-15. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is sufficient.

4. <u>Amount of Money at Stake</u>

The sum of money at stake favors the Record Companies. Including costs, the Record Companies seek a total of \$6,420.00. Pl.'s Mot. for Default J. at 2. While Defendant would suffer from entry of judgment in this amount against her, these damages are authorized by statute. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). For each of the eight specific Copyrighted Recordings Plaintiffs identify, the statute authorizes damages ranging from \$750.00 to \$30,000.00. Id. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant's infringement was willful, which would raise the maximum recovery available to \$150,000.00 for each infringed work. See id.; Am. Compl., ¶ 15. Finally, although the statute authorizes an award of attorney's fees, Plaintiffs have limited their request to costs. U.S.C. § 505; Pl.'s Mot. for Default J. at 4-5. Because the Record Companies are seeking only the minimum authorized award of damages and their actual costs, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of default judgment.

There is little possibility of a dispute concerning material facts. The Record Companies have demonstrated that they have

Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts

exclusive rights in the Copyrighted Recordings. Kerr Decl., \P 5;

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Am. Compl., ¶ 11. Further, the Record Companies have provided adequate evidence of Defendant's unauthorized copying and distribution of the Copyrighted Recordings. See Kerr Decl., ¶¶ 2-8, Exh. 1. Therefore, this factor also favors default judgment.

6. Whether Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect

Defendant's failure to act here is not a case of excusable Prior to bringing suit, Plaintiffs contacted Defendant neglect. and attempted to resolve this matter out of Court. Kerr Decl., $\P\P$ When that failed, Plaintiffs filed suit on September 5, 2006. Defendant was personally served with the Summons and Complaint on September 18, 2006, but did not respond. No. 7; Kerr Decl., $\P\P$ 10-11. Before the Clerk entered default against Defendant, Plaintiffs again contacted her and urged her to respond to the Complaint. Kerr Decl., Ex. 2. The entire cycle was repeated when Plaintiffs served the Amended Complaint and Defendant again failed to respond. Kerr Decl., ¶¶ 14-16. fact, Plaintiffs even served Defendant with notice of the instant Motion, although such notice was not necessary. See Pl.'s Mot. for Default J. at 14 n.4; Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Plaintiffs have made every reasonable effort to engage defendant in this process with no success. Because Defendant's failure to participate in this litigation cannot be considered excusable neglect, this factor favors entry of default judgment.

7. <u>Strong Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits</u>

While it is preferable to decide cases on the merits whenever possible, this preference is not dispositive. Where a party fails to defend against a complaint, as Defendant has failed here, Rule

55 authorizes the Court to enter default judgment. <u>Kloepping v.</u>

<u>Fireman's Fund</u>, No. C 94-2684 TEH, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1786, at

*10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 1996).

In light of all of the $\underline{\text{Eitel}}$ factors discussed above, the Court finds that entry of default judgment is appropriate.

C. Remedy

Plaintiffs request monetary damages, costs, and equitable relief in the form of a permanent injunction.

1. <u>Damages</u>

The Record Companies seek \$6,000.00 in statutory damages. Pursuant to section 504(a) of the Copyright Act, an infringer is liable for either the plaintiff's actual damages or statutory damages. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a). A plaintiff seeking statutory damages may recover between \$750.00 and \$30,000.00 for all infringements of a copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Where a plaintiff chooses to recover statutory damages, he need not prove actual damages. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 1997)(citation omitted). When awarding statutory damages, the Court has broad discretion within the range provided by statute. Id. Here, Plaintiffs have proven that Defendant infringed the eight identified Copyrighted Recordings. Accordingly, the Defendant is liable for \$750.00 in damages for each of the eight infringed Copyrighted Recordings, for a total of \$6,000.00.

2. <u>Costs</u>

Plaintiffs also seek to recover their costs, \$350.00 in filing fees and \$70.00 for service of process, for a total of

\$420.00. <u>See</u> Pl's Mot. for Default J. at 13; Kerr Decl., ¶ 21. By statute, the Court may award a prevailing copyright owner costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees. <u>See</u> 17 U.S.C. § 505. Here, the Plaintiffs seek only to recover their costs, not attorneys' fees. Having successfully proven infringement, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover \$420.00 in costs.

3. <u>Injunctive Relief</u>

Plaintiffs have demonstrated that their exclusive rights in the Copyrighted Recordings have been, and continue to be, violated by the Defendant. In such circumstances, the Court is authorized to issue a permanent injunction to prevent or restrain further infringements. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a); Sega Enters. Ltd. v.

MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 940 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("Generally, a showing of copyright infringement liability and the threat of future violations is sufficient to warrant a permanent injunction.") Injunctive relief is available in copyright actions resulting in default judgment. See e.g., Jackson v. Sturkie, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ("[D]efendant's lack of participation in this litigation has given the court no assurance that defendant's infringing activity will cease. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunctive relief.")

Plaintiffs are entitled to a broad injunction, not limited to the identified Copyrighted Recordings. In addition to the Copyrighted Recordings, the injunction shall extend to all sound recordings owned by the Record Companies or to which the Record Companies are the licensees of exclusive rights. See e.g., Picker Int'l Corp. v. Imaging Equip. Serv., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 18, 45 (D.

Mass. 1995), aff'd sub nom Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Leavitt, 94 F.3d 640 (1st Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the injunction shall prohibit Defendant from infringing any rights in any sound recordings which Plaintiffs may acquire in the future. See Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Elias, No. CV 03-6387, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30385, at *13-14 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2004) (enjoining infringement of existing and future works).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs

Default Judgment. The Court hereby AWARDS Plaintiffs \$6,000.00 in

damages and \$420.00 in costs. The Court also GRANTS Plaintiffs'

request for a permanent injunction.

Defendant shall be and hereby is ENJOINED from directly or indirectly infringing Plaintiffs' rights under federal or state law in any sound recording, whether now in existence or later created, that is owned or controlled by Plaintiffs, or to which Plaintiffs are licensees of exclusive rights under United States copyright, including without limitation, by using the Internet or any online media distribution system to reproduce any such recording, to distribute any such recording, or to make any such recording available for distribution to the public, except pursuant to a lawful license or with the express authority of Plaintiffs. Defendant shall destroy any copies of any sound recordings which Plaintiffs own or to which Plaintiffs are

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1	licensees of exclusive rights, that Defendant has downloaded onto
2	any computer hard drive or server without Plaintiffs'
3	authorization, and all copies of such downloaded sound recordings
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 6, 2007



UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE